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The Sequence of Economic Liberalization
in a Developing Country with Incomplete Financial Market
Yue Ma*
Abstract
In this paper, an incomplete financial market model was built to
illustrate the impacts of the market incompleteness on the benefits of trade
liberalization. Particularly, it will focus on the investigation of the impacts
of different sequences of opening up the goods market. That is, should the
government open up international trade simultaneously with the opening
up the domestic trade, i.e. implementing a “shock therapy” approach? Or
should the government liberalize the domestic goods market first, then to
deregulate the international trade, i.e. following a “gradualism” approach?
This paper proves that the gradualism approach by opening domestic
goods market before liberalization the international trade can guarantee
the successive improvement of everyone’s welfare. Therefore the
gradualism approach is a Pareto improvement sequence.
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1. Introduction
In the WTO agreement that the Chinese government signed at the
end of 2001, the commitment is to open up the Chinese domestic market to
foreign producers and to liberalize the international trade. This policy
clearly is in the spirit of Ricardo’s free trade theory based on comparative
advantage. In reality, the comparative advantage is not easy to be defined
and identified unambiguously. There are always uncertainties and risks.
However, the risk can be fully insured in a complete financial market
according to Arrow-Debreu’s contingent market theory. Hence, trade is
always better-off to everyone.
This argument becomes less strong, however, if one realizes that a
developing economy such as China has a financial market that is far from
complete. For example, the derivatives market in China is completely
underdeveloped. The bond market is tiny. The foreign exchange market is
restricted. Therefore, it is an urgent research topic to reconsider the main
conclusions of economic theory based on the complete market assumptions
for the developed economies when one makes policy recommendations for
a developing country’s government.
Here a good example of China is Professor Peng Shige from
Shangdong University discovered some abnormalities in the international
derivatives markets in the early 1990s that would generate substantial
losses to the Chinese trading firms who were not aware of the problems.
He wrote to the officials in charge and subsequently the trading was
stopped and the potential losses were effectively avoided (Xu, 2005).
In this paper, I will build an incomplete financial market model to
illustrate the impacts of the market incompleteness on the benefits of trade
liberalization. Particularly, I will focus on the investigation of the impacts
of different sequences of opening up the goods market. That is, should the
government open up international trade simultaneously with the opening
up the domestic trade, i.e. “shock therapy” approach? Or should the
government liberalize the domestic goods market first, then deregulate the
international trade, i.e. following a “gradualism” approach?
It is well-known that if the financial market is incomplete, there is no
guarantee that more markets will generate Pareto-optimum outcome
(Magill and Quinzii, 1996). In fact, Hart (1975) found an example that as
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more markets opened, all consumers are effectively worse-off. Hence the
sequence of market liberalization is path-dependent (Duffie and Rahi,
1995).
The main findings of this paper are that both international and
domestic trade are better than no trade even in the incomplete market
economy. However, if a government adopts the “shock therapy” approach
to open up the international and domestic trade simultaneously, it faces a
risk of welfare loss in comparison with the outcome of the gradualism
liberalization approach. This paper proves that the gradualism approach by
opening domestic goods market before liberalization the international trade
can guarantee the successive improvement of everyone’s welfare. That is,
the gradualism approach is a Pareto improvement sequence.
The conclusion of this paper is also consistent with recent research
findings on the Chinese gradualism reform approach. For example, Lau, et
al (2000) found that the dual-track approach adopted by China in her
transition process towards the full market economy is a Pareto
improvement sequence. The gradualism approach was adopted in China to
reform her agricultural sector first (Lin, 1992), and then to reform her
industrial sector (Rawski, 1994). This is to win the political support of the
majority of the rural population for further more difficult and controversial
reforms in the urban area. As a result, the successful gradualism approach
of pro-globalization and pro-entry into the global economy has reduced the
number of poor in China by 150 million, which contributed significantly to
the global poverty reduction (see, for example, Fischer, 2003). It has been
well-recognized that this gradualism strategy has been implemented more
effectively than the ‘shock therapy’ strategy adopted in eastern European
economies (Parente and Rios-Rull, 2005; Lau, et al, 2000).
The main findings of this paper are also consistent with the empirical
findings that emphasize on the importance of the sequence of trade
liberalization for other developing countries (e.g., Krueger, 1997; Lee,
2004). For decades after World War II, Latin America’s Southern Cone
countries (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) pursued inward-looking policies
that relied heavily on government interventions. As a result, each economy
suffered frequent balance of payments crises, hyper-inflation, and low
economic growth. Starting from 1970s, these governments attempted to
3

switch from import-substitution industrialization strategy to a more neutral
one by engaging in a sequence of liberalizing external sectors first, but
domestic macroeconomic stabilization later. There were rapid financial
market deregulation and reduction of trade barriers (Corbo and de Melo,
1985). This sequencing of reform led to a persistent real exchange rate
appreciation, current account deficits, a large build-up of external debt, and
eventual default in the debt crises in the 1980s (Corbo, de Melo, and
Tybout, 1986; Edwards, 1989).
Nevertheless, international experiences of “shock therapy” approach
also have successful examples. For instance, New Zealand endured a
combination of high inflation and low economic growth in the 1970s. The
policy response of the National Party was active interventionist to fix
wages, prices, exchange rates, rents, interest and dividends. That led to an
early election under the short notice in 1984 with 93.7% turnout, an
indication of the desire by voters for a change of economic policy (Miller,
2005). The Labour Party under the leadership David Lange won a
landslide victory in the election and quickly implemented a rapid
programme of deregulation and public-sector restructuring (Evans, et al,
1996). It was argued that any delay of liberalization, as gradualism
suggests, there would have been time for the opposing forces within the
Labour Party to block the reforms or severely limit them (Lange, 1996).
That is because these “shock therapy” reforms adopted monetarist
approaches to control inflation, to sell state assets, and to remove tariffs
and subsidies. They were strongly opposed by traditional Labour
supporters. However, the implementation of these liberal reforms by a
‘wrong’ party perhaps was more credible as voters knew that the ‘leftwing’ Labour Party would pay more attention to the social welfare than the
‘right-wing National Party (see Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) that
provided a theory to explain this apparent incongruity). In the end, the
Labour Party led by David Lange was re-elected for a second term in 1987.
It is left for future research to embed the credibility of government policy
in the simple model developed in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds
a simple two-period model with heterogeneous consumers and incomplete
financial market. Section 3 provides the theoretical analysis of the model
4

solution. Section 4 conducts a Monte Carlo simulation. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2. A heterogeneous consumer model with incomplete financial market
In my simple model, there are two countries. The domestic country
has less developed economy with two types of consumers (i and j), two
goods (1 and 2), and two states (v and w). Yet the financial market is
incomplete with just one asset (see Ma (2007) for a full description of the
model). As the focus is on the domestic economy, the foreign country is
modeled as simple as possible. It is assumed that foreign country is a
developed economy with just one type of consumer (f) who also consumes
two goods. There are two periods in the model: the initial time period and
the first time period. Consumers in both countries enjoy utility of
consumption in the first period only. The utility of consumer k (=i, j and f)
is given as follows:
uk(s) = α1k ln x1k ( s ) + (1- α1k )ln x2k ( s ) ,
where consumer k=i, j, f, and state s=v, w. α1k is the preference of
consumer k for good 1 . xhk (s ) is consumer k’s consumption of good h in
state s.
The expected utility is given by:
k
U = αk uk(v) + (1-αk)uk(w),
where αk is the probability of state v that is believed to occur by consumer
k, and the three consumers are disagreed on the this probability, i.e.,
αi≠αj≠αf. Therefore, it is a model with heterogeneous consumers.
Consumer k’s endowment vector is ( e1k ( s ) , e2k ( s ) ) if state s occurs.
In the financial market, there is only one asset. One unit of the asset
yields r(s) unit of monetary return in state s. Clearly this single asset cannot
span the state space. Complete market should have 2x2=4 contingent
markets in the Arrow-Debreu world, or 2 (assets) + 2 (spots) = 4 markets
in a Rander equilibrium. With a single asset in my model, the financial
market is therefore incomplete.
The budget constraint of consumer k in state s is therefore given as
follows:
Ωk(s) = p1(s) e1k ( s ) + p2(s) e2k ( s ) + r(s) q kA = p1(s) x1k ( s ) + p2(s) x 2k ( s ) + pA q kA ,

or,
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δΩk(s) = p1(s)[ e1k ( s ) - x1k ( s ) ]+ p2(s)[ e2k ( s ) - x2k ( s ) ]+[r(s)- pA] q kA = 0,
where Ωk(s) is the total wealth of consumer k including the net gains from
asset transaction, ph(s) is the spot price of good h in state s, ehk (s ) and xhk (s )
are endowment and consumption of good h for consumer k in state s,
respectively, r(s) is the return of asset in state s, pA is the price of asset, q kA
is the quantity of asset held by consumer k. q kA >0 indicates consumer k
purchases q kA of asset; q kA <0 means consumer k sells q kA of asset to the
market.
In the following section, we will focus on the solution of sequential
economy. In a sequential economy, consumers make a consumption plan
based on the anticipated prices of consumption goods with rational
expectations. They will share their risk partially through the incomplete
financial market in the initial period. The spot markets then open at the
subsequent time period. Consumers will fulfill their financial obligations at
the financial market and will buy and sell consumption goods at the spot
market. Therefore, the long-run equilibrium is achieved through a series of
short-run transactions.
However, the sequential economy of trade liberalization can be taken
place by two different strategies. One of the strategies is to open up the
international trade immediately, a ‘shock therapy’ approach. Another one
is to adopt a ‘gradualism’ approach by opening up the domestic trade first
and then to open up the domestic market to international traders. In an
incomplete market setting like my model presented here, we will show the
consequences of these two strategies are quite different. That is, the
outcome is path dependent.
3. Trade strategies in an incomplete financial market
3.1. ‘Shock therapy’ liberalization strategy
Under this strategy, the domestic government will open up the
international trade immediately, starting from autarky position. Consumers
in both countries will maximize their utilities subject to the budget
constraint defined in the previous section.
Form the Lagrangian for consumer k’s (k=i, j, f) optimization
problem as
6

Lk = αkuk(v) + (1-αk)uk(w) + λk(v) δΩk(v) + λk(w) δΩk(w)
=αk α1k ln x1k ( v ) + αk(1- α1k )ln x 2k ( v ) + (1-αk) α1k ln x1k ( w) + (1-αk)(1- α1k )ln x 2k ( w)
+λk(v) { p1(v)[ e1k ( v ) - x1k ( v ) ]+ p2(v)[ e2k ( v ) - x 2k ( v ) ]+[r(v)- pA] q kA }
+λk(w) { p1(w)[ e1k ( w) - x1k ( w) ]+ p2(w)[ e2k ( w) - x 2k ( w) ]+[r(w)- pA] q kA }

The first-order necessary conditions for the consumption choices are
then
∂Lk/∂ x1k (v ) =0 => x1k (v ) =αk α1k /[λk(v)p1(v)],
∂Lk/∂ x2k (v ) =0 => x2k (v ) =αk(1- α1k )/[λk(v)p2(v)],
∂Lk/∂ x1k ( w) =0 => x1k ( w) =(1-αk) α1k /[λk(w)p1(w)],
∂Lk/∂ x2k ( w) =0 => x2k ( w) =(1-αk)(1- α1k )/[λk(w)p2(w)],
Substituting xhk (s ) into the budget constraints, we can solve out λk(s)
λk(v) = αk /[ p1(v) e1k (v ) + p2(v) e2k (v ) +[r(v)- pA] q kA ],
λk(w) = (1-αk)/[ p1(w) e1k ( w) + p2(w) e2k ( w) +[r(w)- pA] q kA ],
There are three market equilibrium conditions for goods 1 and 2, as
well as for the asset market. Setting the spot price of good 1 as numeraire,
the equilibrium condition for goods market 2 is:
x 2i ( s ) + x 2j ( s ) + x 2f ( s ) = e2i ( s ) + e2j ( s ) + e2f ( s ) ,
which solves for p2(s) as follows:
p2(s)= {(1- α1i ) e1i ( s ) +(1- α1j ) e1j ( s ) +(1-β1) e1f ( s ) +( α1i q iA + α1j q Aj +β1 q Af )
[pA -r(s)]} / [ α1i e1i ( s ) + α1j e1j ( s ) +β1 e1f ( s ) ]
The first-order necessary conditions for the asset holdings are
k
∂L /∂ q kA =0 => λk(v)[r(v)- pA] + λk(w)[r(w)- pA]=0,
The asset market equilibrium is
q iA + q Aj + q Af =0
Solving this nonlinear simultaneous equation system will obtain the
equilibrium of the ‘shock therapy’ strategy.
Proposition 1. All consumers will not be worse-off after the
international trade, comparing with the no-trade autarky.
This proposition is easily proven as all consumers have maximized
their utility after trade, their utility levels are at least as high as that of
endowments before trade.
3.2. Partial liberalization strategy of opening domestic trade only
Under this strategy, there is only trade between domestic consumers i
and j. International trade is not permitted. The first-order conditions for
7

domestic consumers are the same as before, but the market equilibrium
condition is changed to:
x 2i ( s ) + x 2j ( s ) = e2i ( s ) + e2j ( s ) ,
which solves for p2(s) as follows:
p2(s)= {(1- α1i ) e1i ( s ) +(1- α1j ) e1j ( s ) +( α1i q iA + α1j q Aj )[pA -r(s)]} / [ α1i e1i ( s ) + α1j e1j ( s ) ]

The asset market equilibrium becomes
q iA + q Aj =0
Solving this new nonlinear system will obtain the equilibrium of the
domestic trade.
Proposition 2. All consumers will not be worse-off after the
international trade, comparing with the no-trade autarky.
This proposition is similar to Proposition 1, although the trade is
restricted to domestic trade only. However, it is difficult to compare the
benefits from international trade with the domestic trade theoretically. That
is, international trade may not be a Pareto improvement over the domestic
trade, and vice versa. This remains an important empirical question to be
investigated later in Section 4.
3.3. Gradualism reform strategy to open up the international trade
This strategy will open the domestic market for domestic consumers
as the first stage of liberalization process. The solution of this intermediate
stage is obtained from subsection 3.2. The solution of the domestic trade
effectively generates the new endowments for domestic consumers for
their second-stage trade, which will be trade with both domestic consumers
and foreign consumers. The solution of the second-stage international trade
can be obtained from subsection 3.1, with initial endowments being
replaced by the equilibrium from the first stage domestic trade. The final
equilibrium therefore is obtained through a sequence of solving two
nonlinear systems.
Proposition 3. Gradualism reform strategy is a Pareto improvement
process for domestic consumers.
Proposition 2 provides the proof for the conclusion that the first stage
domestic trade is a Pareto improvement for both domestic consumers.
Based on the endowments from the domestic trade, the consumers continue
to maximize their utilities from international trade. Therefore, both
8

domestic consumers will not be worse-off after the international trade,
comparing with the domestic trade.
The key question now is which liberalization strategy, the shock
therapy one or the gradualism one, generates more benefits for domestic
consumers, and for foreigners. Given the complexity of the nonlinear
system, there is no analytical solution available for the model to answer
this question. A Monte Carlo simulation is therefore conducted in the next
section with two real economies’ structures as background.
4. Monte Carlo simulation
This section reports the results from a Monte Carlo simulation for the
theoretical model built in the previous section. The economic background
of the simulation is based on the empirical regional data from China (the
domestic economy) and Japan (the foreign economy) in 2003. The regional
disparity in the Chinese economy provided a natural complementarity for
her domestic trade. Furthermore, it is well-known that China adopted the
open door policy since 1978 and negotiated to have joined the WTO at the
end of 2001. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether China
should open up her domestic market first before further liberalizing her
market for international trade. The foreign economy is chosen as Japan as
the Japanese economy is one of the economies with lowest income
inequality among the industrialized countries (Akita and Kataoka, 2003). It
is therefore consistent with the simple assumption of the theoretical model.
The two types of consumption are chosen as goods and services,
which are two most important consumptions of a modern economy. The
latest regional data for Japan is 2003 and therefore Chinese data is chosen
for 2003 accordingly. Therefore are 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities in mainland China. The mean, standard deviation, minimum,
and maximum values of GDP per capita for goods and services across 31
regions in mainland China are presented in Table A. The data source is
China Statistical Yearbook 2004, published by National Bureau of
Statistics (2004). In Japan, there are 47 regional prefectures with various
levels of GDP per capita for both goods and service. Table A also presents
their mean, standard deviations, minimum, and maximum values. The data
source is Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts 2005, published by
9

Government of Japan (2006). The geographical location of the regions of
Japan and China are given by Fig 1 and 2, respectively.
Comparing the two economies in Table A, two interesting results can
be observed. The first one is that Japanese income per capita is
substantially higher than that of China. In fact, average regional GDP per
capita is around 31 times of that in China. The second one is that Japanese
regional disparity in terms of standard deviation is much lower than that in
China. For Japan, the ratios of the highest to lowest GDP per capita for
goods and services are 4.4 and 3.2 times, respectively, which are
substantially lower than the corresponding ratios of 10.3 and 17.8 times in
mainland China. Therefore, China has a long way to catch up both the
level of income as well as the equality of income distribution of Japan.
For the Monte Carlo simulation, a model is constructed with a
similar structure of the theoretical model built in the previous section.
There are two (groups of) consumers (labeled as i and j) in domestic
economy of China. There is one group of consumers in the foreign country
Japan (denoted as f). Truncated normal distributions are assumed for the
preferences of consumers, the expectations of the probability of the
occurrence of the two states, v and w, the endowments of goods and
services for all consumers, and the return of assets in the two states. The
normality assumption is consistent with the law of large samples. The
truncation is imposed for the preference and probability due to their (0, 1)
bound. The truncations for the endowments are imposed by the minimum
and maximum levels of GDP per capita in goods and services of the two
countries. The only ad hoc assumption for the truncation of asset returns is
to distinguish a ‘good’ return (below one yet still positive) and a ‘bad’
return (above one but less than 2). Similarly, endowments vary in these
two states too.
Specifically, the preference of consumers for goods is assumed to be
a standard normal distribution with truncation of [0.1, 0.9]. The asset
return in a ‘good’ state (v) has a standard normal distribution with
truncation of [1, 2]. Whilst a ‘bad’ state (w) will have the return with a
standard normal distribution with truncation of [0.1, 0.9]. For the
distribution of endowment, the simulated the sample has the truncation of
empirical minimum and maximum values of regional GDP per capita for
10

goods and services respectively. Furthermore, the simulated the sample has
been matched with the empirical mean and standard deviation as close as
possible based on the following criteria:
SQE=(µsimu - µempirical)2+(σsimu - σempirical)2
where SQE is the sum of squared error, µsimu and σsimu are the mean and
standard deviation of simulated sample, respectively, µempirical and σempirical
are the mean and standard deviation of the empirical data of regional GDP
per capita.
In the Monte Carlo simulation, 1,000 independent pseudo-random
numbers are generated for each of the variables. The statistics of the
simulated sample are presented in Table 1. For each set of random
variables of the preferences of consumers, the expectations of the
probability of the occurrence of the two states, v and w, the endowments of
goods and services for all consumers, and the return of assets in the two
states, the utility derived from no trade (autarky) is calculated for each
consumer and is presented in column (1) of Table 2. If the domestic market
is liberalized directly to international trade following a so-called ‘shock
therapy’ strategy, domestic consumers i and j are able to engage in
domestic and international trades simultaneously. That is, they can trade
with each other as domestic trade as well as trade with foreigner f in the
international trade. The result is then obtained along the optimal solution
from the theoretical model and is presented in column (2) of Table 2.
However, an alternative open door policy is to follow a ‘gradualism’
approach and to open up the domestic trade first before the international
trade. The intermediate result of opening the domestic trade only is
presented in column (3) of Table 2. The final outcome of liberalizing the
domestic market to international trade, following the opening of domestic
trade, is presented in the last column of Table 2. A quick look of the three
different trade policies in column (2) to (4) against the outcome of autarky
in column (1) indicates clearly that any trade is better than no trade. Any
trade generates an upward shift of the mean, the minimum, and the
maximum values of the utility of any individual consumer against their
corresponding levels in autarky. This fact is confirmed Table 3, in which
the differences between the utility of trade and autarky are calculated. The
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mean and minimum values of the utility differentials are all positive in
columns (1) to (3).
To test whether this upward shift of the utility is significant, a formal
test is necessary to carry out. There are two issues we need to consider
before choosing an appropriate test. The first issue is that consumers i and j
in fact belong to one country. A comparison of welfare across different
policies should treat them as a pair. That is, the significance of their gains
from trade should be considered jointly for both of them, rather than being
considered separately.
The second issue is whether the distribution of the upward shift in
the utility is normal distribution. If this were the case, then a parametric
test such as Hotelling’s T2 test (Hotelling, 1931), which is a multivariate
version of the univariate t-test, can be applied. Unfortunately, the
normality tests on the utility differentials of Table 4 based on skewness and
kurtosis both failed at the 5% level for all individuals. As a result, a more
sophisticated non-parametric version of the Hotelling’s T2 test described by
Zwick (1985) is applied in this study. It is a rank multivariate analysis to
test the significance of the positive gains in utility form trade. The rank test
results are also reported in Table 3. Interestingly, it is found that both
Chinese consumers i and j have significant benefit from any trade,
according to the χ2(2) tests. The Japanese consumer f nevertheless has no
significant benefit, as shown by the χ2(1) tests. This is probably due to the
fact that the income level of Chinese consumers is substantially lower than
their Japanese counterparts. The trade benefits therefore are significant for
low income consumers.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that trade is better than no-trade perhaps
is not surprising at all. It was discovered by David Ricardo (1817) nearly
200 years ago. It is also proven by the theoretical model in the incomplete
financial market structure in the previous section. The important issue is to
compare different sequences of liberalizing policies since the outcome is
path-dependent in an incomplete financial market structure. This exercise
is carried out in Table 4. Using the benchmark of the partial liberalization
policy of opening the domestic trade, columns (1) and (2) in Table 4
indicate that this is inferior to both full liberalization policies of shock
therapy strategy and gradualism reform for Chinese consumers. The
12

difference in utility of full liberalization and domestic trade is always
positive. Furthermore, the non-parametric test indicates that the both full
liberalization policies generate higher utilities that that of domestic trade
for the Chinese consumers significantly at the 5% level. This resolves an
important empirical question and concludes that full liberalization is better
than partial liberalization.
Finally, Table 4 compares the utility levels of shock therapy strategy
and gradualism reform. It can be observed that there is clear a trade-off
between the two liberalization strategies. In column (3) of Table 4, the
maximum values of the utility differential for both domestic consumers are
positive. It shows there are occasions that the shock therapy strategy can
make at least one domestic consumer worse-off in comparison with the
gradualism strategy. Nevertheless, the gradualism reform cannot be
dominant the shock therapy strategy. The minimum values of the utility
differential in column (3) of Table 4 for both domestic consumers are all
negative. It means that shock therapy strategy can generate better outcome
for at least one consumer.
Interestingly, the utility levels of these two strategies are not
significantly different at the 5% level for both Chinese and Japanese
consumers according to the non-parametric rank test. This implies both full
liberalization strategies reach similar final outcomes and cannot be
discriminated statistically.
However, this conclusion deserves some qualification if one looks at
the columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 carefully. In column (1) of Table 4, the
minimum values of the utility differential for both domestic consumers are
negative. It shows there are occasions that the shock therapy strategy can
make at least one domestic consumer worse-off in comparison with the
domestic trade. This implies that the outcomes from shock therapy strategy
are not always preferred for the at least one of domestic consumers. That is,
the shock therapy strategy is not a Pareto improvement in relation to
domestic trade equilibrium.
In contrast, the minimum values of the utility differential in column
(2) of Table 4 for both domestic consumers are always positive. This
confirms our Proposition 3 that gradualism reform is a Pareto improvement
over domestic trade, which is also a Pareto improvement over no-trade
13

autarky. It clearly shows that the outcome of full liberalization is pathdependent when the financial market is incomplete.
Furthermore, the standard deviation of gradualism reform is lower
than that of shock therapy strategy (cf. Table 2), implying that the outcome
under this policy is also more stable than the shock therapy approach.
5. Conclusion
Based on a simple incomplete financial market model, this paper
demonstrates that the full trade liberalization is path-dependent. Although
both shock therapy and gradualism approaches reach to a statistically
similar equilibrium with higher utility for all consumers, the gradualism
approach may be preferred since it is a Pareto improvement process for
domestic consumers. Both the theoretical results and the Monte Carlo
simulations confirm this conclusion. The policy implication for a
developing economy such as China is profound. It means that the
government should open its domestic market for domestic consumers first
before opening it to international trade. Domestic trade provides a solid
foundation for the domestic consumers to face the opportunity and
challenges from the international trade with foreign traders.
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Fig 1. Map of Japan

Tourism is one of Nara's largest industries.
A number of major companies have factories in Shiga such as IBM Japan, Canon.
Tokyo’s GDP of around US$1.315 trillion is greater than the 8th largest national economy in
the world. It is a major international/domestic finance center, and serves as a hub for Japan's
transportation, publishing, and broadcasting industries.
Source: Servas Japan Organization: www.servas-japan.org/images/japan-trip.gif
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Fig 2. Map of China
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Table A. Disparity of regional GDP per capita (in ‘000 US$) in goods and services: China vs Japan
China

Japan

31

47

sample size
goods

services

total

goods

services

total

statistics

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

mean

0.834

0.596

1.429

7.909

21.828

29.737

min

0.282
(Guizhou)

0.154
(Guizhou)

0.435
(Guizhou)

3.589
(Tokyo)

16.886
(Nara)

21.796
(Nara)

max

2.913
(Shanghai)

2.732
(Shanghai)

5.645
(Shanghai)

15.655
(Shiga)

53.490
(Tokyo)

57.079
(Tokyo)

st. dev.

0.538

0.587

1.097

2.832

5.317

5.441

Gap ratio
(max/min)

10.3

17.8

13.0

4.4

3.2

2.6

Table 1. Heterogeneous preferences, expectations, endowments, and asset returns
(sample size: 1,000 )
Preference Expectations

Endowments
state v

(A)

Consumer i

Consumer j

Foreigner f

(B)
Asset return

Statistics

state w

goods

services

goods

services

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(1)

(2)

mean

0.4998

0.5003

0.9002

0.7101

0.9165

0.7130

st. dev.

0.1473

0.1287

0.4562

0.4188

0.4955

0.4158

min

0.1024

0.1549

0.2820

0.1539

0.2828

0.1549

max

0.8965

0.8322

2.5391

2.5752

2.6776

2.6661

mean

0.4984

0.5035

0.9098

0.7140

0.9203

0.6960

st. dev.

0.1492

0.1328

0.4655

0.4205

0.4632

0.4091

min

0.1124

0.1319

0.2825

0.1536

0.2818

0.1536

max

0.8895

0.8710

2.8253

2.5787

2.7924

2.0845

mean

0.5042

0.4965

7.8073

22.7001

7.8525

22.4878

st. dev.

0.1504

0.1476

2.7816

4.3186

2.8267

4.2695

min

0.1093

0.1079

3.6109

16.8923

3.6096

16.9094

max

0.8926

0.8988

15.5328

38.3985

15.5915

43.0573

mean

1.4913

0.4994

st. dev.

0.1880

0.1543

min

1.0016

0.1059

max

1.9913

0.8993
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Table 2. Simulated utilities (sample size: 1,000 )

Consumer i

Consumer j

Foreigner f

Autarky

International
trade under
shock therapy

Domestic
trade only

International
trade under
gradualism
reform

Statistics

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

mean

-0.3714

0.0378

-0.2810

0.0395

st. dev.

0.2948

0.3647

0.2760

0.3262

min

-1.3324

-0.8527

-1.1742

-0.8389

max

0.5000

1.4256

0.5791

1.1275

skewness

-0.0326

0.2312

-0.0320

0.0962

kurtosis

-0.2885

-0.0043

-0.2255

-0.1445

mean

-0.3687

0.0417

-0.2744

0.0435

st. dev.

0.3049

0.3727

0.2791

0.3326

min

-1.3513

-0.9348

-1.2973

-0.8747

max

0.5092

1.5943

0.5290

1.6011

skewness

-0.0670

0.2073

-0.1373

0.1642

kurtosis

-0.2729

0.1663

-0.0407

0.3388

mean

2.5455

2.5542

2.5539

st. dev.

0.2218

0.2153

0.2156

min

1.7995

1.8279

1.8238

max

3.1024

3.10303

3.10304

skewness

-0.3155

-0.2572

-0.2607

kurtosis

0.1287

0.0531

0.0587
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Table 3. Difference in utility between trade and autarky (sample size: 1,000 )

Consumer i

Consumer j

Joint test for
uktrade=ukautarky,
k=i,j

International trade
under shock
therapy strategy

Domestic trade
only

International trade
under gradualism
reform

Statistics

(1)

(2)

(3)

mean

0.4092

0.0905

0.4109

st. dev.

0.3148

0.0800

0.2465

min

0.0034

0.0006

0.0216

max

1.8287

0.6193

1.5555

skewness

1.2661

1.6791

1.0355

kurtosis

1.6611

3.9298

1.2096

mean

0.4104

0.0943

0.4123

st. dev.

0.3140

0.0909

0.2471

min

0.0034

0.0003

0.0181

max

1.8126

0.6160

1.5940

skewness

1.2401

2.0575

1.0220

kurtosis

1.5918

5.5280

1.2408

χ2(2)

P-value

Foreigner f

Test for
Uftrade=ufautarky

858.23

85.91

0.0000

0.0000

858.17
0.0000

mean

0.0088

0.0084

st. dev.

0.0112

0.0108

min

0.000028

0.000026

max

0.1277

skewness

4.0799

4.2473

kurtosis

28.7792

31.4037

χ2(1)

0.6124

0.5622

P-value

0.4339

0.4533

n.a.
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0.1250

Table 4. Difference in utility of various trade reforms (sample size: 1,000 )

Consumer i

Consumer j

Joint test for
uktrade=ukautarky,
k=i, j

Foreigner f

Shock therapy
strategy
vs
domestic trade
only

Gradualism reform
vs
domestic trade only

Gradualism reform
vs
shock therapy
strategy

Statistics

(1)

(2)

(3)

mean

0.3187

0.3204

0.0017

st. dev.

0.3073

0.2383

0.1793

min

-0.3528

0.0021

-0.5953

max

1.5328

1.5124

0.6360

skewness

1.1029

1.1493

0.0006

kurtosis

1.3376

1.3711

0.7664

mean

0.3161

0.3180

0.0018

st. dev.

0.3063

0.2366

0.1822

min

-0.3939

0.0039

-0.6423

max

1.6915

1.4887

0.8720

skewness

1.1092

1.1852

0.2481

kurtosis

1.5154

1.5395

1.4774

χ2(2)
P-value

618.07

0.0000

0.0000

0.2516
0.8818

mean

-0.0004

st. dev.

0.0011

min

-0.0119

max

Test for
Uftrade=ufautarky

596.02

n.a.

0.0018

skewness

-5.0328

kurtosis

36.4233

χ2(1)

0.0023

P-value

0.9616

21

